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NOTE
RECOGNIZING PARENTAL CONSORTIUM:
MONTANA FOLLOWS A NATIONAL TREND IN
PENCE v. FOX
Shane A. Vannatta
I. INTRODUCTION
For years many states have allowed husbands and wives to re-
cover damages for the emotional loss suffered when a spouse is se-
riously injured. The husband or wife can independently sue the
tortfeasor for the loss of the injured spouse's society, company, af-
fection and sexual relations. These so-called "loss of consortium"
cases traditionally marked the boundary of recovery for family
members of an injured person where the injuries were not fatal.
Historically, courts did not permit anyone other than the
spouse-not brothers or sisters, grandparents, cousins, uncles or
aunts-to claim loss of consortium, no matter how close a relation-
ship a relative had with the injured party. Although the common
law recognized three different forms of consortium, spousal consor-
tium,' parental consortium,2 and filial consortium,' most states
limited the recovery of consortium damages in injury cases exclu-
sively to the spousal relationship.
Recently in Pence v. Fox,4 Montana joined a growing minority
1. Spousal consortium is generally defined as those rights inhering in the husband-wife
relationship which allows one spouse to recover for the loss of "company, society, co-opera-
tion, affection, and aid of the other in every conjugal relation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 280
(5th ed. 1979).
2. Parental consortium is typically defined as the child's right inhering in the parent-
child relationship for the loss of "parental aid, protection, affection, society, discipline, guid-
ance and training." Pence v. Fox, 248 Mont. 521, 527, 813 P.2d 429, 433 (1991),
3. Filial consortium is the reverse of parental consortium; it is the parent's right to
recover damages for the loss of a child's society and companionship. See Todd R. Smyth,
Annotation, Parent's Right to Recover For Loss of Consortium in Connection with Injury
to Child, 54 A.L.R. 4th 112, 116 (1987 & Supp. 1992).
4. 248 Mont. 521, 813 P.2d 429 (1991).
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of jurisdictions recognizing a child's right to recover for the loss of
parental consortium.' In Pence, the Montana Supreme Court
broadly expanded state tort law and eliminated a disparity be-
tween the rights of adults and those of children to recover consor-
tium damages.6 In recognizing a new cause of action for parental
consortium, however, the court failed to address a number of im-
portant issues and to provide adequate guidance to the Montana
bench and bar regarding this new cause of action.
The discussion that follows focuses on the Montana Supreme
Court's decision in Pence v. Fox. This Note first summarizes the
historical developments of consortium in the common law and ex-
plains the statutory foundation for parental consortium in Mon-
tana's code. Second, this Note discusses the court's reasoning and
unanimous decision to expand tort law to include a cause of action
for parental consortium. Finally, this Note analyzes the implica-
tions of recognizing a new cause of action for parental consortium
and identifies areas requiring further clarification by the Montana
Supreme Court.
II. LEGAL FOUNDATION FOR PARENTAL CONSORTIUM
A. Historical Development of Consortium
Traditional concepts of consortium are deeply rooted in the
ancient Roman civil law. Under Roman law, the legal rights of a
family were vested in the male head of the household. In the eyes
of the law, the male head, or paterfamilias, personified the house-
hold.' Any intentional tortious injury to any member of his family
was an injury suffered directly by him.' The paterfamilias could
recover damages for injury to his wife, child, slave or servant just
5. Id. at 527, 813 P.2d at 433. Note that the phrase "loss of consortium" is often
misused. As the Texas Supreme Court noted in Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463 (Tex.
1991):
The phrase "loss of consortium" is more accurately described as an element of
damage rather than a cause of action. But courts have so frequently used the
phrase to denote those actions in which loss of consortium is the major element of
damage that "loss of consortium" has come.to be referred to as a cause of action.
Id. at 464 n.1 (quoting Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Tex. 1978)).
6. Pence, 248 Mont. at 526-27, 813 P.2d at 433.
7. Susan G. Ridgeway, Comment, Loss of Consortium and Loss of Services Actions:
A Legacy of Separate Spheres, 50 MONT. L. REV. 349, 352 (1989); Marian F. Ratnoff, Note,
The Case of the Lonely Nurse: The Wife's Action for Loss of Consortium, 18 W. RESERVE L.
REV. 621, 623-24 (1967).
8. Ridgeway, supra note 7, at 352.
9. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 129, at 980
(5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER].
[Vol. 54
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as he would recover for an intentional tortious injury to himself.10
English common law adopted the paterfamilias model from
the Roman civil law, and developed the concept of consortium in
the context of the master-servant relationship." Women and chil-
dren, under English common law, were recognized merely as ser-
vants of their male masters (husbands or fathers).1 2 A husband or
father could sue for the intentional tortious injuries to his wife or
children and the resulting loss of services just as a master would
sue for the loss of his servant's labor."3 English common law de-
fined consortium exclusively as the loss of services resulting from
an intentional tortfeasor's acts.'
In the nineteenth century, many American states adopted the
English model of consortium based on the master-servant relation-
ship.'5 American courts originally limited recovery for consortium
to intentional tortious acts, but as the common law developed, the
courts extended consortium damages to provide relief for the negli-
gent acts of a tortfeasor.'1 Sanford v. Inhabitants of Augusta17 was
the first case in an American court to extend a loss of consortium
claim to a husband based on a negligent tortious injury to his
wife. 8
The Married Women's Acts,'9 adopted by state legislatures
throughout the United States in the late 1800s and early 1900s,
transformed the legal underpinning of consortium from the
master-servant relationship to a contract-based relationship. 0 The
Married Women's Acts effectively severed the singular legal entity
of marriage developed under English common law,2 ' and. granted
women the right to sue and be sued in their own names.22 With the
10. Id. at 979-80.
11. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442; Jacob Lippman, The Breakdown of
Consortium, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 651, 653 (1930).
12. Jean C. Love, Tortious Interference with the Parent-Child Relationship: Loss of
an Injured Person's Society and Companionship, 51 IND. L.J. 590, 600 (1976).
13. Guy v. Livesey, 79 Eng. Rep. 428, 428 (K.B. 1619) (allowing recovery for a wife as a
servant). See also Love, supra note 12, at 600.
14. Guy, 79 Eng. Rep. at 428.
15. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-1-109 (1991) (adopting English common law in
general).
16. Sanford v. Inhabitants of Augusta, 32 Me. 536, 539 (1851).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Also known as "Married Women's Property Acts." See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. §§
40-2-101 to -315 (1991).
20. Lippman, supra note 11, at 662-64. See also Ridgeway, supra note 7, at 355.
21. A married woman's identity was no longer subsumed in that of her husband's
identity. Ratnoff, supra note 7, at 627. See also Lippman, supra note 11, at 656 (character-
izing a woman in Old England as a Dred Scott or nonperson).
22. Ratnoff, supra note 7, at 627 (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, § 101, at
1993]
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lifting of this legal disability, courts were forced either to allow a
woman the right to recover for the loss of her husband's consor-
tium or to eliminate consortium altogether.13 Courts generally ex-
tended women the right to sue for loss of consortium for inten-
tional tortious injuries to their husbands rather than to eliminate
consortium altogether."' Women were first extended the right to
recover for negligent tortious acts in 1950 in Hitaffer v. Argonne
Co.
25
Montana only recently began extending loss of consortium
claims to plaintiffs other than husbands. A woman's right to bring
a loss of spousal consortium claim in Montana was first recognized
by a Montana Federal District Court in 1961.26 In 1986, the Mon-
tana Supreme Court in Bain v. Gleason2 also granted a wife the
right to state a separate and distinct cause of action for spousal
consortium.28
Since 1986 the Montana Supreme Court has limited consor-
tium actions solely to the spousal relationship. Either a husband or
a wife could recover for the loss of consortium caused by the inten-
tional or negligent acts of a third party resulting in serious injury
to the spouse. Until Pence v. Fox, however, the Montana Supreme
Cour, had never confronted the issue of parental consortium.
B. Statutory Support for Parental Consortium
Montana's code has no specific provisions regarding parental
consortium. The code, however, does provide persuasive collateral
support for Montana courts to recognize a parental consortium
cause of action. Montana's code is replete with statutes that seek
to protect the welfare of Montana's youth and preserve the family
relationship in general2 9 As argued by counsel for the Pence chil-
672 (2d ed. 1955)).
23. Lippman, supra note 11, at 662.
24. PROSSER, supra note 9, at 932 nn.8-9.
25. 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950).
26. Duffy v. Lipsman-Fulkerson & Co., 200 F. Supp. 71 (D. Mont. 1961).
27. 223 Mont. 442, 726 P.2d 1153 (1986).
28. Id. at 445, 726 P.2d at 1155.
29. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212 (1991) (requiring courts to "determine cus-
tody in accordance with the best interest of the child"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-222 (1991)
(declaring the intent of the legislature to "assure minor children frequent and continuing
contact with both parents"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-201 (1991) (presuming all children
born in wedlock to be legitimate); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-211 (1991) (obligating the custo-
dial parent(s) of a child to provide the child with "support and education suitable to his
circumstances"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-101 (1991) (declaring the policy of the state of
Montana to "preserve the unity and welfare of the family whenever possible"); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 41-3-102 (1991) (defining harm to a child's health or welfare as "the harm that occurs
whenever the parent or other person responsible for the child's welfare ... causes [the
[Vol. 54
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dren, a synthesis of Montana's family law 0 and minors statutes1
suggests a public policy that favors recognizing consortium duties
in the parent-child relationship and a cause of action for the subse-
quent loss.32
Montana's code implies a contractual basis for the parent-
child relationship analogous to the marital contract.3 Section 40-6-
211 outlines the obligations of parents to "give support and educa-
tion" to their children.3 4 Arguably this language corresponds to the
"obligations of mutual respect, fidelity and support"35 found in the
marital contract.3  From this analogous contractual foundation,
one can argue that parental consortium and spousal consortium
have similar legal basis.
An additional source of support for a parental consortium
cause of action stems from the public policy pronouncements of
Montana's Child Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency statutes. 8
These statutes implicitly declare Montana's strong policy to pro-
mote and enforce a child's right to the consortium inhering in the
parent-child relationship. Section 41-3-101 states, "the policy of
• . . Montana [is] to. . . insure that all youth are afforded an ade-.
quate physical and emotional environment to promote normal de-
velopment."3" The code further defines harm to a child's welfare as
any act or omission by a parent that causes a child's "failure to
thrive."'40 These statutes are regularly used in child abuse and neg-
child's] failure to thrive").
30. See MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 40 (1991).
31. See MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 41 (1991).
32. See Brief of Plaintiffs and Appellants at 6-7, Pence v. Fox, 248 Mont. 521, 813
P.2d 429 (1991) (No. 90-483) [hereinafter Appellants' Brief].
33. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-211 (1991) (codifying the parents obligation to support
and educate their children); cf. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-101 (1991) (codifying the mutual
obligations of husband and wife to each other).
34. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-211 (1991) provides: "The parent or parents entitled to
the custody of a child must give him support and education suitable to his circumstances."
35. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-101 (1991).
36. Compare MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-101 (1991), with MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-6-211
and -301 (1991). The mutuality of contractual obligations in the parent-child relationship
becomes more apparent upon analysis of sections 40-6-211 and -301. The parent assumes
the obligation to provide his/her with child support and education during the child's years
of minority, and the child assumes the obligation to provide "necessary food, clothing, shel-
ter, and medical attendance" if the parent should ever become indigent. MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 40-6-211 and -301 (1991). See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-214 (1991) (codifying the
reciprocal duties of parents and children in maintaining each other); Pence, 248 Mont. at
525, 813 P.2d at 432 (describing the similarity in contractual obligations between husband-
wife and parent-child).
37. Appellants did make this argument. See Appellants' Brief, supra note 32, at 6-7.
38. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 41-3-101 to -1152 (1991).
39. MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-101(a) (1991) (emphasis added).
40. MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-102(3)(c) (1991).
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lect actions to enforce the statutory duties inhering in the parent-
child relationship. These inherent obligations are the same inter-
ests protected by loss of parental consortium actions.4
Montana's Wrongful Death Statute42 also suggests support for
a parental consortium cause of action. The Wrongful Death Stat-
ute currently allows a minor child to recover consortium damages
when a parent dies as the result of the tortious acts of a third
party. 3 Prior to Pence, however, if a tortfeasor merely injured the
parent, even if severely, leaving the parent unable to interact nor-
mally with the child, the child would receive no consortium
damages.4
Making an award of parental consortium damages contingent
solely upon the occurrence of the parent's death is unfair consider-
ing the damage suffered by the child of the catastrophically injured
parent is comparable.4 5 No rational basis exists for allowing a child
to recover for consortium damages when a parent dies, but not
when a parent is seriously injured and incapacitated. 4 The loss of
consortium to the child is very real in either case, and the child's
welfare warrants protection.
In addition, the "best interest of the child" statute47 lends fur-
ther support for recognizing a parental consortium claim. The pol-
icy of parental consortium to protect the child's right to the aid,
society, guidance, and training of the parent(s) parallels the policy
underlying the "best interests of the child test" in custody deter-
minations.4 8 A court considers two factors in determining child
custody; they are: (1) "the interaction and interrelationship of the
child with his parent or parents""44 and (2) "the child's adjustment
41. Pence, 248 Mont. at 527, 813 P.2d at 433.
42. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-513 (1991). This statue provides:
When injuries to and the death of one person are caused by the wrongful act or
neglect of another, the personal representative of the decedent's estate may main-
tain an action for damages against the person causing the death or, if such person
be employed by another person who is responsible for his conduct, then also
against such other person.
43. Dawson v. Hill & Hill Truck Lines, 206 Mont. 325, 329, 671 P.2d 589, 591 (1983)
(noting that Montana "allows recovery in a wrongful death action for loss of care, comfort,
society and companionship").
44. Counsel for the Pence children strenuously argued this point. See Appellants'
Brief, supra note 32, at 11.
45. Gino L. Gabrio, Comment, Actions for Loss of Consortium in Washington: The
Children Are Still Crying, 56 WASH. L. REv. 487, 489 (1981).
46. Id.
47. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212 (1991).
48. Pence, 248 Mont. at 527, 813 P.2d at 433.
49. MONT CODE ANN. § 40-4-212(1)(c) (1991).
[Vol. 54
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to his home." 50 Where a parent is seriously injured and incapaci-
tated, the injury typically interferes with the normal parent-child
relationship and adjustment to his home. The Montana Supreme
Court in Pence logically found that preserving the best interests of
the child in such injury cases required the court to recognize a pa-
rental consortium claim."
III. PENCE V. Fox
A. The Facts
John Pence, husband of Judy Pence and father of Brittney
and Jared Pence, was injured on January 2, 1988, when he climbed
out of a hot tub manufactured and installed by defendants.52 John
Pence "trotted" a short distance from the hot tub when, without
warning, he lost consciousness and collapsed forward. His face
struck the frozen ground with such force that his C5 vertebra burst
and rendered him a permanent quadriplegic.54 At the time of
John's accident, Brittney Pence was four years old and Jared was
three years old.55
John Pence, individually, and Judy Pence, individually and as
the guardian ad litem of Brittney and Jared Pence, filed suit in
state district court against the manufacturers and installers of the
hot tub. 6 Brittney and Jared asserted claims against defendants
for "the loss of value of [John Pence's] services and for the loss to
them of his society, companionship and comfort. '57Defendants moved for dismissal of Brittney and Jared's pa-
rental consortium action for failure to state a claim on which the
court could grant relief.58 The district court dismissed Brittney
and Jared's claims for parental consortium59 and held that paren-
tal consortium, although analogous to spousal consortium, does not
have the same type of contractual basis as spousal consortium.60
50. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212(I)(d) (1991).
51. Pence, 248 Mont. at 527, 813 P.2d at 433.
52. Id. at 523, 813 P.2d at 430.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 522, 813 P.2d at 430.
57. See Appellants' Brief, supra note 32, at 4.
58. Pence, 248 Mont. at 522, 813 P.2d at 430.
59. Id. at 523, 813 P.2d at 430.
60. Pence v. Fox, No. CDV-90-036, (Montana Eight Judicial District Court, Cascade
County, Aug. 17, 1990) (order and judgment denying parental consortium claims). The dis-
trict court stated that "the basis for a consortium claim lies in the Montana statutes in
which the husband and wife contract for obligations of mutual respect, fidelity, and sup-
port." Id. (quoting Bain v. Gleason, 223 Mont. 442, 445, 726 P.2d 1153, 1155 (1986)).
1993]
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Judy Pence, as guardian ad litem, appealed the judgment."'
The Montana Supreme Court reversed and remanded."2
B. The Holding
The court in a unanimous decision held that minor children
may sue and recover for the loss of parental consortium when a
parent is injured by a negligent tortfeasor.6 3 The court further held
that the injured parent, the spouse, or a child may recover pecuni-
ary damages for an injured parent's economic losses, but en-
couraged the trial court to consider such damage awards to prevent
double recovery for any element of damages. "' Finally, the court
held that damages for loss of parental consortium "are recoverable
only by the child."' 5
C. The Reasoning
The decision in Pence reflects the slow, but inevitable devel-
opment of tort law throughout the United States.6 Although
courts considering the issue of parental consortium have not unan-
imously accepted the new tort claim, 7 the Montana Supreme
Court noted the growing trend among state courts to recognize a
new cause of action for parental consortium. 8
While the supreme court considered leaving the decision to
recognize a cause of action for parental consortium to the Montana
61. Pence, 248 Mont. at 522, 813 P.2d at 430.
62. Id. On remand the case settled before trial; the defendants paid consideration for
the parental consortium claim. Telephone Interview with Norman L. Newhall, Attorney of
Record for the Pences, Alexander, Baucus & Linnell, P.C. (Nov. 18, 1992).
63. Id. at 527, 813 P.2d at 433.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 523, 813 P.2d at 430-31.
67. See, e.g., Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858 (Cal. 1977); Gaver v. Har-
rant, 557 A.2d 210 (Md. App. 1989); DeAngelis v. Lutheran Medical Ctr., 445 N.Y.S.2d 188
(N.Y. App. Div. 1981), aflfd, 449 N.E.2d 406 (1983); Butz v. World Wide, Inc., 492 N.W.2d
88 (N.D. 1992); High v. Howard, 592 N.E.2d 818 (Ohio 1992); Steiner v. Bell Tel. Co., 517
A.2d 1348 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986), aff'd, 540 A.2d 266 (1988).
68. Pence, 248 Mont. at 524, 813 P.2d at 431. As of February 7, 1993, 11 other jurisdic-
tions have judicially recognized a cause of action for loss of parental consortium.
Hibpshman v. Prudhoe Bay Supply, Inc., 734 P.2d 991 (Alaska 1987); Villareal v. Arizona
Dep't. of Transp., 774 P.2d 213 (Ariz. 1989); Weitl v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 1981),
modified by Audubon-Exira Ready Mix, Inc. v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. Co., 335 N.W.2d 148
(Iowa 1983); Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 690 (Mass. 1980); Berger
v. Weber, 303 N.W.2d 424 (Mich. 1981); Williams v. Hook, 804 P.2d 1131 (Okla. 1991);
Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. 1991); Hay v. Medical Center Hosp., 496 A.2d 939
(Vt. 1985); Ueland v. Reynolds Metals Co., 691 P.2d 190 (Wash. 1984); Theama v. City of
Kenosha, 344 N.W.2d 513 (Wis. 1984); Nulle v. Gillette-Campbell County Joint Powers Fire
Bd., 797 P.2d 1171 (Wyo. 1990).
8
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Legislature, it rejected the argument that the court was ill-
equipped to address the issue.69 The court concluded that "[s]uch
an argument ignore[d the court's] responsibility to face a difficult
legal question and accept judicial responsibility for a needed
change in the common law."' 70 The supreme court observed that
"when the conditions and needs of the society have changed,
judges must adapt the common law to those new conditions." 71 It
acknowledged the Montana Legislature's power to "ratify, limit or
reject" the court's decision in Pence.72 The Montana court recog-
nized the compelling support for parental consortium embodied in
Montana public policy.73 The court found that Montana's statutes
implicitly support a child's right to recover parental consortium
damages.7
In considering the foundation for creating this new cause of
action, the Montana Supreme Court expressly rejected the argu-
ment that consortium is limited to the marriage contract relation-
ship. The court explained that section 40-2-101,75 which outlines
the contractual duties of a married couple, does not "create" the
cause of action for loss of consortium.76 Instead, the statute
"merely defines the obligations which inhere in the marriage rela-
tionship and upon which the common law action is based. '77
IV. ANALYSIS
The Montana Supreme Court's recognition of a parental con-
sortium cause of action is a logical development of tort law in
Montana. As Chief Judge Hatfield, U.S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of Montana, noted in a court order in Allstate Insurance Co.
v. Froman:
71
[T]here exists no rational basis for denying the interests of chil-
dren in the emotional benefits flowing from the family while rec-
ognizing and protecting the interests of spouses and parents in
what are essentially the same benefits. 79
69. Pence, 248 Mont. at 524, 813 P.2d at 431.
70. Id. (quoting Hay, 496 A.2d at 945-46).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 525, 813 P.2d at 431 (quoting Hay, 496 A.2d at 946).
73. Id. at 527, 813 P.2d at 433.
74. Id. See supra discussion in Section II(B).
75. MONT. CODE. ANN. § 40-2-101 (1991).
76. Pence, 248 Mont. at 525, 813 P.2d at 432.
77. Id.
78. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Froman, No. CV-89-142-GF (D. Mont. Aug. 18, 1990) (order
granting child's motion for summary judgment on parental consortium claim).
79. Id.
1993]
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The Montana Supreme Court, in recognizing this new cause of
action, did not address a number of important issues: (a) Can con-
sortium be extended to other family relationships? (b) Is the join-
der of parental consortium claims with the tort claims of the in-
jured parent and the spouse merely encouraged or compulsory?
and (c) Is a child's right to parental consortium derivative or com-
pletely independent of the primary tortious injury to the parent?
A. Extending Consortium to Other Relationships
The Montana Supreme Court clearly recognized the child's
right to sue for the loss of parental consortium, but did not indi-
cate whether consortium claims extend to other family relation-
ships. Creating a parental consortium cause of action could open a
floodgate of similar consortium claims for grandparents, siblings,
aunts and uncles, cousins, and other relatives. Other state supreme
courts have dismissed the "floodgates argument" by limiting the
consortium cause of action to two basic relationships-the hus-
band-wife relationship and the parent-child relationship.80 As the
Texas Supreme Court noted:
While all family members enjoy a mutual interest in consortium,
the parent-child relationship is undeniably unique and the well-
spring from which other family relationships derive. It is the par-
ent-child relationship which most deserves protection and which,
in fact, has received judicial protection in the past.
The distinction between the interests of children and those of
other relatives is rational and easily applied. Most children are
dependent on their parents for emotional sustenance. This is
rarely the case with more remote relatives. Thus, by limiting the
plaintiffs in the consortium action to the victim's children, the
courts would ensure that the losses compensated would be both
real and severe.81
The Montana Supreme Court invites future litigation by not
expressly limiting consortium actions to the immediate family. Be-
cause of the Pence court's recognition of parental consortium, dis-
trict courts are more likely to move forward and consider other
family members' claims for loss of consortium. Already, the Pence
80. See, e.g., Weitl v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259, 266 (Iowa 1981) (recognizing a cause of
action for parental consortium); Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463, 466 (Tex. 1991) (recog-
nizing a cause of action for parental consortium).
81. Reagan, 804 S.W.2d at 466 (quoting Villareal v. Arizona Dep't. of Transp., 774
P.2d 213, 217 (Ariz. 1989) and Theama v. City of Kenosha, 344 N.W.2d 513, 521 (Wis.
1984)).
[Vol. 54
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decision has encouraged one Montana district court to recognize a
new cause of action for loss of filial consortium.2 Recognizing a
cause of action for filial consortium is the next logical step in the
consortium area; the statutory and common law basis for filial con-
sortium and parental consortium are nearly identical, 8 and both
are rooted in the parent-child relationship. The supreme court,
however, has left the door open for other relatives to bring loss of
consortium claims because the court chose not to explicitly limit
consortium claims to the spousal and parent-child relationships.
B. Making Joinder of Claims Compulsory
The Montana Supreme Court in Pence approved of joining pa-
rental consortium claims with the claims of the primary tort vic-
tim,8" but did not definitively compel such joinder. Critics who op-
pose this new cause of action for parental consortium often argue
that the claim encourages a multiplicity of lawsuits. 5 For example,
each of the nine children of a catastrophically injured parent could
bring a separate cause of action for loss of parental consortium.86
Although statistically unlikely," the scenario suggests the potential
for abuses.
The Montana Supreme Court should have followed other state
supreme courts in requiring that all claims for loss of consortium
be joined with those of the primary tort victim whenever feasible. 88
82. Lescantz v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins., No. DV-90-131 (Dist. Ct. Mont. Nov. 20,
1991), MONTANA LAW WEEK, Nov. 30, 1991, at 1-2. The Defendants appealed the decision of
the district court, but allowed the appeal to lapse; the Montana Supreme Court did not have
an opportunity to render a decision. Telephone Interview with Mr. Ed Smith, Clerk of the
Montana Supreme Court (Feb. 8, 1992). See definition of filial consortium, supra note 3.
83. For statutory support of filial consortium, see MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-6-214, -221
and -236 (1991).
84. The Montana Supreme Court approved of the district court's action to postpone
the trial of John Pence's claim until the outcome of the appeal so that the cases could be
tried together if the supreme court upheld the children's claim. Pence, 248 Mont. at 527,
813 P.2d at 433.
85. Annotation, Child's Right of Action for Loss of Support, Training, Parental At-
tention, Or the Like, Against a Third Person Negligently Injuring Parent, 11 A.L.R. 4th
549, 564-65 (1982 & Supp. 1992).
86. See Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858, 863-64 (Cal. 1977) (mother of
nine children was severely injured and all nine children brought a separate claim for loss of
parental consortium).
87. See Borer, 563 P.2d at 868-69 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (using the Statistical Abstract
of the United States to show that the proportion of families in the United States with sev-
eral children is low); Gabrio, supra note 45, at 494-95 (stating that only 8.8 percent of U.S.
families have three or more children).
88. See, e.g., Hibpshman v. Prudhoe Bay Supply, Inc., 734 P.2d 991, 997 (Alaska
1987); Weitl v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259, 270 (Iowa 1981), modified by Audubon-Exira Ready
Mix, Inc. v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. Co., 335 N.W.2d 148 (Iowa 1983); Hay v. Medical Center
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Compulsory joinder would eliminate double recovery, 9 multiplicity
of suits, and maximize judicial economy.90 Furthermore, compul-
sory joinder could assist the jury in appropriately allocating dam-
ages among the plaintiffs' respective claims since all victims of the
tortfeasor appear before the jury.
C. Independent or Derivative Cause of Action
The Montana Supreme Court created a "separate cause of ac-
tion for loss of parental consortium," 91 but left unclear whether the
new cause of action is independent or derivative" of the parent's
primary tortious injury. The distinction is important because of
the current debate developing in many appellate courts around the
nation. 3
The distinction between derivative and independent cause of
action is crucial because counsel for the child-plaintiff must deter-
mine how the statute of limitations applies to the parental consor-
tium claim. For example, if the parental consortium cause of action
is independent, a child's minority status tolls the statute of limita-
tions until the child's eighteenth birthday.9' A minor child suffer-
ing a loss of parental consortium could wait to bring an action un-
til after he or she reaches the age of majority and the applicable
statute of limitations begins to run. If the cause of action is deriva-
Hosp., 496 A.2d 939, 943 (Vt. 1985); Ueland v. Reynolds Metals Co., 691 P.2d 190, 193-94
(Wash. 1984). One method of compelling joinder is illustrated by a quote from a recent
North Dakota Supreme Court case:
In the future, if the "deprived" party fails to join the claim, that party must offer
the court a compelling reason for non-joinder or it will be dismissed with
prejudice. Absent a compelling reason, non-joinder will result in an absolute bar to
any loss of consortium claim asserted after the conclusion of the underlying action
of the "impaired" party.
Butz v. World Wide, Inc., 492 N.W.2d 88, 91 (N.D. 1992).
89. Love, supra note 12, at 626-28. The Montana Supreme Court did note in Pence
that joinder would "prevent double recovery for economic losses." Pence, 248 Mont. at 527,
813 P.2d at 433.
90. David P. Dwork, Note, The Child's Right to Sue for Loss of a Parent's Love, Care
and Companionship Caused by Tortious Injury to the Parent, 56 B.U. L. REV. 722, 732-33
(1976): "[Although the overcrowding of dockets is a legitimate concern to both the courts
and society, there are procedural mechanisms [such as joinder] that would allow the courts
to provide legal redress to children whose parents have been wrongfully injured without
substantially increasing the burden on the courts." Id.
91. Pence, 248 Mont. at 527, 813 P.2d at 433.
92. For a general discussion of the nature of a derivative action, see PROSSER, supra
note 9, at 937-39.
93. PROSSER, supra note 9, at 938-39. Courts differ on whether a claim for loss of con-
sortium is derivative or independent, and often make conclusory observations about the
nature of consortium without fully analyzing it. Id.
94. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-401 (1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-101 (1991).
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tive, however, the courts could require joinder where feasible, or
require that the statute of limitations on the child's parental con-
sortium claim run consecutively with the parent's primary tort
claim. 5
The distinction between derivative and independent causes of
action is important because an affirmative defense to the primary
tort victim's claim may diminish the secondary victim's parental
consortium claim."6 Affirmative defenses in Montana include as-
sumption of risk, 7 contributory negligence, 8 and the worker's
compensation statutes.9 9 If the cause of action is independent, an
affirmative defense against the primary tort action does not neces-
sarily effect the parental consortium action.100 If the cause of ac-
tion is derivative, however, "the viability of a loss of parental con-
sortium claim is wholly dependent upon the viability of the injured
parent's personal injury cause of action." 101
The Montana Supreme Court, in determining whether the pa-
rental consortium cause of action is independent or derivative, may
rely on precedent in the spousal consortium area to characterize
the cause of action as derivative. ' " In Priest v. Taylor, the su-
preme court held that spousal consortium "is completely deriva-
tive from the other spouse's claim." ' The court in Priest recog-
nized that a spousal consortium claim is "an independent and
distinct cause of action," but noted that it is the same conduct of
defendant that gives rise to both the victim's claim and the
spouse's loss of consortium claim. ' °
Other jurisdictions that have addressed the independent/de-
rivative issue in a parental consortium context generally have de-
95. See, e.g., Hibpshman v. Prudhoe Bay Supply, Inc., 734 P.2d 991, 997 (Alaska
1987) (requiring joinder where feasible); Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 413
N.E.2d 690, 696 (Mass. 1980) (allowing the statute of limitations for the child's parental
consortium claim to run consecutively with the primary tort claim).
96. PROSSER, supra note 9, at 937.
97. MONT. R. Civ. P. 8(c). See Laura D. Hayes, Note, Assumption of Risk in Mon-
tana: An Analysis of the Supreme Court's Treatment of the Doctrine, 53 MONT. L. REV.
291, 296 n.38 (1992).
98. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-702 (1991).
99. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-411 (1991) (stating that "[flor all employments covered
under the Worker's Compensation Act . . . the provisions of [the Worker's Compensation
Act] are exclusive").
100. See Love, supra note 12, at 631.
101. Farley v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co., No. L-90-323, 1992 WL 32111, at *10
(Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 21, 1992), certifying questions to and rev'd Farley v. Progressive Casu-
alty Ins. Co., 597 N.E.2d 86 (Ohio 1992).
102. Priest v. Taylor, 227 Mont. 370, 740 P.2d 648 (1987).
103. Id. at 379, 740 P.2d at 653 (emphasis in original).
104. Id.
1993]
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cided to characterize the cause of action as derivative.10 5 The Ari-
zona Supreme Court in Villareal v. Arizona Dep't of Transporta-
tion expressed the most logical statement for characterizing the
cause of action as derivative: "A defendant in a consortium case is
liable to the child because the defendant injured the child's parent
and thereby damaged the parent-child relationship. Both the
child's claim and the parent's claim are based on the same conduct
of the defendant."106
Characterizing the parental consortium cause of action as de-
rivative also encourages the simultaneous settlement of all tort
claims against the defendant.10 7 A defendant is more likely to set-
tle with the injured parent, spouse, and children if the defendant is
aware of the potential outcome at trial and the injured victims are
willing to settle. 10 8
V. CONCLUSION
The Montana Supreme Court's recognition of parental consor-
tium damages in Pence parallels a trend in the United States. An
increasing number of jurisdictions acknowledge the inherent injus-
tice of not recognizing consortium damages in the parent-child re-
lationship, while recognizing consortium damages in the husband-
wife relationship. Montana's common law and statutory law pro-
vide strong persuasive support for the recognition of parental con-
sortium and, perhaps, filial consortium as well.
Although the Montana Supreme Court carefully explained the
common law and statutory basis for recognizing this new cause of
action, the court did not define and limit parental consortium
damages for future litigation. In the future the court should ex-
pressly limit consortium claims to the immediate family, require
compulsory joinder of consortium claims with that of the original
tort victim's claims, and clearly define the cause of action for pa-
rental consortium as derivative. The Montana judicial system can
expect to see further litigation in the consortium area to clarify
these issues arising from the decision in Pence v. Fox.
105. See, e.g., Villareal v. Arizona Dep't. of Transp., 774 P.2d 213, 219 (Ariz. 1989);
Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463, 466 (Tex. 1991); PROSSER, supra note 9, at 938 n.96.
106. Villareal, 774 P.2d at 220.
107. Farley, 1992 WL 32111 at *9.
108. Id.
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